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I. INTRODUCTION
Although the imposition of capital punishment on juveniles may
come as a shock to some, such punishment nevertheless has a long
history of acceptance in this country and is reflected in contemporary
sentencing practices. Between the years 1982 and 1988 there were
1
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2,106 death sentences imposed in the United States.' Of those in-
dividuals who were sentenced to death, five were under the age of
sixteen, 2 approximately ten were sixteen years of age,3 and thirty
were seventeen years of age at the time the crime was committed.
4
However, of those juveniles sentenced, a substantial number were
not executed, but were granted executive clemency. Even though
these statistics reflect a host of controversial conclusions, there nev-
ertheless appears to be a consensus that (1) executive clemency is
an indicator that there is at least executive unrest in executing in-
dividuals for crimes committed at an age below eighteen years; and
(2) because there are an extremely low number of juvenile executions
compared to the number of adult executions (about two percent)
prosecutors and jurors question whether the most extreme sanction
is proper and/or constitutional when applied to individuals under
the age of eighteen.
6
Last Term, in Thompson v. Oklahoma,7 the United States Su-
preme Court addressed this issue and all nine Justices agreed on
two fundamental propositions concerning the imposition of capital
punishment on juveniles:
[T]here is some age below which a juvenile's crimes can never be constitutionally
punished by death, and that our precedents require us to locate this age in the
light of the 'evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society."'
Although the Thompson Court was invited to draw that line at
eighteen years of age, the plurality Court refused to do so and only
ruled on the facts of the case at hand; it held that no juvenile
1. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2687, 2697 (1988).
2. Id.
3. Stanford v. Kentucky, 109 S. Ct. 2969, 2977 (1989). From 1982 through 1988, out of 2,106
total death sentences only fifteen were imposed on individuals who were sixteen or under when they
committed their crimes. Since five of those fifteen individuals were fifteen-years-old - and the last
execution of any individual below the age of sixteen was in 1948 (See, Thompson, 108 S. Ct. 2687
(1988)) - it is logical to assume that ten of those individuals were sixteen years old.
4. Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2977.
5. Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2717 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
6. Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2977.
7. 108 S. Ct. 2687 (1988).
8. 108 S. Ct. at 2706 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
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offender who at the time of the capital offense was below sixteen
years of age may be sentenced to death. Because the Thompson
Court limited its ruling to the facts in that case (which involved a
fifteen-year-old capital offender) it only partially addressed the crit-
ical issue: whether any individual who at the time of the capital
offense was below eighteen years of age may be sentenced to death.
Even though capital sentencing of sixteen and seventeen-year-old
offenders was currently recognized by legislators and the courts, the
United States Supreme Court, by not confirming the constitution-
ality of this punishment, created some doubt as to whether the ex-
ecution of a sixteen or seventeen-year-old was unconstitutional as
well.
Less than one year later, however, the Court decided whether
the execution of sixteen or seventeen-year-olds was constitutional in
Stanford v. Kentucky.9 In determining whether the death penalty
imposed on an individual who committed murder at sixteen or sev-
enteen years of age constitutes "cruel and unusual" punishment un-
der the Eighth Amendment, the instant case afforded the Court an
opportunity to either expand its precedent as set out in Thompson,
or to confirm our nation's age-old capital sentencing practices with
respect to sixteen and seventeen-year-old capital offenders.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASES
Stanford v. Kentucky involved the shooting death of twenty-year-
old Baerbel Poore in Jefferson County, Kentucky. On the evening
of January 7, 1981, Poore was repeatedly raped and sodomized by
Kevin Stanford and his accomplice during and after the commission
of a robbery at a gas station where she was employed as an atten-
dant. Stanford and his accomplice then drove her to a secluded area
near the station, where Stanford shot her point-blank in the face
and then in the back of the head. Stanford committed the murder
when he was approximately seventeen years and four month of age.
After Stanford's apprehension, a Kentucky juvenile court con-
ducted hearings to determine whether he should be transferred for
9. 109 S. Ct. 2969, Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2978.
1989]
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trial as an adult under Kentucky law. 10 Stressing the seriousness of
Stanford's offenses and the unsuccessful attempts of the juvenile
system to treat him for numerous instances of past delinquency,"
the juvenile court found certification for trial as an adult to be in
the best interest of Stanford and the community.'
2
In August, 1982, Stanford was tried and convicted of murder,
first-degree sodomy, first degree robbery, and receiving stolen prop-
erty and was sentenced to death and forty-five years in prison. The
Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the death sentence and stated that
Stanford's "age and possibility that he might be rehabilitated were
mitigating factors appropriately left to the consideration of the jury
that tried him."' 3
Wilkins v. Missouri involved the stabbing death of Nancy Allen,
a twenty-six-year-old mother of two who was working behind the
sales counter of the convenience store she and her husband owned
and operated in Avondale, Missouri. On July 27, 1985, Heath Wilk-
ins and his accomplice, Patrick Stevens, carried out Wilkins' plan
to rob the convenience store and murder "whoever was behind the
counter" because "a dead person can't talk.' '1 4 According to his
prearranged plan, Wilkins ordered a sandwich while Stevens went
to the rest room behind the counter. Once Nancy Allen was close
to the rest room door, Stevens rushed out and grabbed her. Wilkins
went around the counter and thrust his knife into her back. Wilkins
10. Id. at 4977. (Citing Ky. Rev. Stat. § 208.170 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1982)) That statute
provided that
if the court determines that probable cause exists [to believe that a person 16 years old or
older committed a felony or that a person under 16 years of age committed a Class A
felony or capital offense], it shall then be determined if it is in the best interest of the
child and the community to order such a transfer based upon the seriousness of the alleged
offense; whether the offense was against person or property, with greater weight being given
to offense against persons; the maturity of the child as determined by his environment; the
child's prior record; and the prospects for adequate protection of the public and the like-
lihood of reasonable rehabilitation of the child by the use of procedures, services, and
facilities currently available to the juvenile justice system.
11. Stanford v. Kentucky, 734 S.W.2d 781, 792 (Ky. 1987). Since the age of ten, Stanford has
revolved in and out of juvenile court having committed various offenses including arson, burglary,
sexual abuse, theft and assault, to name but a few.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. State v. Wilkins, 736 S.W.2d 409, 411 (Mo. 1987).
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testified that he was aiming at her kidneys, which he thought would
be a fatal wound.1 5
Nancy Allen fell to the floor and rolled onto her back. When
Stevens had difficulty operating the cash register, he asked Wilkins
what to do. Allen replied, directing Stevens to what he sought but
this caused Wilkins to stab her three more times in her chest, two
of which pierced the heart. She continued to speak, begging for her
life. Defendant silenced her with four stabs to the neck, one of which
opened the carotid artery. Wilkins and Stevens then exited the store
leaving Nancy Allen on the floor in a pool of blood.'
6
Wilkins was apprehended on August 10, 1985 and was advised
of his rights. Wilkins admitted that he robbed the convenience store
and also admitted that he murdered Nancy Allen. Wilkins was six-
teen years and six months of age at the time of the murder; six
months short of majority in Missouri.
17
Because Wilkins was roughly six months short of the age of
majority for purposes of criminal prosecution, he could not auto-
matically be tried as an adult under Missouri law. Before that could
happen, the juvenile court was required to terminate juvenile court
jurisdiction and certify Wilkins for trial as an adult. 8 Relying on
15. Id. at 412.
16. Id. Though the coroner indicated that Nancy Allen may have been dead by the time de-
fendant imparted the last wound, it was the opinion of the trial court, the Missouri Supreme Court,
and the United States Supreme Court that Mrs. Allen was not dead until sometime after Wilkins and
Stevens exited the convenience store.
17. Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2973.
18. Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2978. That statute provided that in determining whether to transfer
a juvenile the court must consider:
(1) The seriousness of the offense alleged and whether the protection of the community
requires transfer to the court of general jurisdiction;
(2) whether the offense alleged involved viciousness, force and violence;
(3) whether the offense alleged was against persons or property with greater weight
being given to the offense against person, especially if personal injury resulted;
(4) whether the offense alleged is a part of a repetitive pattern of offenses which
indicates that the child may be beyond rehabilitation under the juvenile code;
(5) the record and history of the child, including experience with the juvenile justice
1989]
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the "viciousness, force and violence" of the alleged crime, Wilkins'
maturity, and the failure of the juvenile justice system to rehabilitate
him after previous delinquent acts, 19 the juvenile court made the
necessary certification on August 15, 1985.20
After hearing the evidence, including Wilkins' own testimony and
the medical experts' testimony concerning his competency to stand
trial,2' the court accepted the pleas of guilty to all charges including
murder in the first degree.
22
At the sentencing hearing on June 27, 1986, Wilkins was sen-
tenced to death for the murder of Nancy Allen. The Missouri Su-
preme Court affirmed the trial court's finding, ruling that the
evidence supported a determination that the defendant was com-
petent to stand trial, that the court properly considered Wilkins' age
in imposing the death penalty, that the death sentence was supported
by aggravating factors, and that the death sentence was not dis-
proportionate or excessive when compared to similar cases.
23
system, other courts, supervision, commitments to juvenile institutions and other placements;
(6) the sophistication and maturity of the child as determined by consideration of his
home and environmental situation, emotional condition and pattern of living;
(7) the program and facilities available to the juvenile court in considering disposition;
and
(8) whether or not the child can benefit from the treatment or rehabilitative programs
available to the juvenile court.
19. Id. at 4975.
20. Id. Wilkins, 736 S.W.2d at 413. Neither of the two medical experts that examined Wilkins
were of the opinion that he suffered from a mental disease or defect as defined by Missouri law,
notwithstanding the fact that both experts knew that Wilkins intended to plead guilty to all charges
and pursue the death penalty.
21. Id. at 414.
22. Id. at 409.
23. For instance, in Wilkins's case, there was great emphasis placed on whether Wilkins was
competent to stand trial, and whether he was competent to proceed pro se. A competency hearing
was set for April 16, 1986, to inquire into the competency of Wilkins at the time of his act as well
as his present competency to stand trial. During the competency hearing the trial court first became
fully aware that Wilkins wanted to release counsel and proceed pro se, plead guilty, waive jury trial
and actively seek a sentence of death as his penalty. Although the trial court found him competent
to stand trial, the trial judge, however, did not immediately grant Wilkins's request to proceed pro
se, and ordered that a hearing be set on April 23, 1986, to determine whether defendant may proceed
pro se. When the hearing resumed on April 23, 1986, the judge strongly voiced his belief that Wilkins
should be represented by counsel, and fully explained the consequences of his action. Seeing that
Wilkins would not accept representation by counsel, the court set a pleading for May 9, 1986. At
[Vol. 92
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Though there were numerous points taken up by the Kentucky
and Missouri Supreme Courts, 24 the main issue before the United
States Supreme Court was essentially whether the imposition of cap-
ital punishment on an individual for a crime committed at sixteen
or seventeen years of age constitutes "cruel and unusual" punish-
ment under the Eighth Amendment. In resolving this issue, the Court
asked (1) whether the sentence constituted one of "those modes or
acts of punishment that had been considered cruel and unusual at
the time that the Bill of Rights was adopted, ' 25 and (2) whether the
sentence is contrary to the "evolving standards of decency that mark
the progress of a maturing society." ' 26 In a five-four decision, a
plurality of the Court affirmed the Kentucky and Missouri Supreme
Courts' decisions holding that the imposition of the death penalty
on an individual for a capital crime committed at sixteen or sev-
enteen years of age does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment
under the Eighth Amendment. 27
III. PRIOR LAW
A. The Juvenile Court System in the United States
1. The Advent of the Juvenile Court System
The early criminal law did not differentiate between the adult
and the minor who had reached the age of criminal responsibility;
the fundamental thought in criminal jurisprudence was not refor-
mation but punishment, and this principle was applied to children
as well as adults.
the pleading hearing, the court again fully persisted in its efforts to convince Wilkins that waiving
counsel was unwise. Wilkins politely but firmly rejected the courts advice. However, the learned trial
judge ordered that counsel be present to represent Wilkins in the event the defendant changed his
mind.
In Stanford's case, there was great emphasis placed on whether the police had probable cause
to arrest Stanford and whether his confession to a Corrections Officer was admissible. The trial court
and the Kentucky Supreme Court answered those questions in the affirmative.
24. Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2971 (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405 (1986)).
25. Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2971 (quoting Trop, 356 U.S. at 101).
26. Stanford, 109 S. Ct. 2969.
27. Annotation, Homicide by Juvenile - Jurisdiction, 48 A.L.R.2D 663, 665 (1956).
1989]
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The early reformers were appalled by the procedures and pen-
alties applied to adults, and were profoundly convinced that society's
duty to the child could not be governed entirely by the concept of
justice. They believed that society's role was not to ascertain whether
the child was guilty or innocent, but to consider the best interest
of the child and "to save him from a downward career."28 The child
was to be "treated" and "rehabilitated" and the procedures from
apprehension through institutionalization were to be "clinical" rather
than punitive.
29
The juvenile court movement began in this country at the end
of the last century. From the first juvenile court statute adopted in
Illinois in 1899, the system has spread to every State in the Union,
to the District of Columbia, and to Puerto Rico.30 Notwithstanding
society's and the courts' earlier views of punishing juveniles, the
courts have since favored statutes creating courts having jurisdiction
of juvenile delinquents, and the juvenile courts have been charac-
terized by the courts as "progressive, humanitarian, and benefi-
cial.",31
2. Procedural Distinctions
Although the statutes in some jurisdictions vest in the juvenile
courts original jurisdiction of offenses committed by minors up to
a certain age,32 an exception is made in so far as capital offenses
or those punishable by death or life imprisonment are concerned,33
which results in taking away from the juvenile courts, and conferring
upon the general courts, jurisdiction of the more serious grades of
homicide, such as first or second degree murder, committed by those
28. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15 (1967).
29. Id. at 16.
30. Id. at 14.
31. Homicide by Juvenile - Jurisdiction, supra note 23.
32. Homicide by Juvenile - Jurisdiction, supra note 23, at 700. Ages vary from state to state
but generally eighteen years of age is the limit for juvenile jurisdiction.
33. AM. JuR. 2D Criminal Law § 26 (1981). A "capital" crime is the denomination ordinarily
used to describe an offense punishable by death. However, the death penalty is held not to be nec-
essarily an essential element of a capital offense. See also, Lycans v. Bordenkircher, 159 W. Va. 137,
222 S.E.2d 14 (1975).
[Vol. 92
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who otherwise would be under the jurisdiction of the juvenile courts.34
Frequently, where such discretionary authority is originally vested
in the juvenile court, and the state seeks a waiver of juvenile court
jurisdiction in order that the youthful offender may be prosecuted
as an adult, the burden of proof is on the state to show that the
defendant is not amenable to the rehabilitative measures available
to the juvenile court. Some jurisdictions, however, have enacted sta-
tutes that place the burden on the juvenile charged with certain
violent crimes to prove that he would be amenable to the care,
treatment, and training program available through the facilities of
the juvenile court. 35 Finally, the United States Supreme Court has
upheld the transfer of juveniles to criminal courts when there has
been a hearing on the transfer sufficient to demonstrate that there
has been a full investigation, and specific enough to permit mean-
ingful review.
36
The criteria to be utilized in making the waiver decision may be
set forth in the juvenile court act itself (such as those statutes in
the instant case), 37 Federal Acts, 38 or in court decisions. Of the sta-
tutes, there are some variations as to the precise exclusionary lan-
guage used. Generally, though, the exclusionary language is suchi as
to remove from the jurisdiction of the juvenile court the higher
degrees of homicide, but frequently not lesser degrees, such as man-
slaughter. 39 Of the court decisions setting forth the factors juvenile
courts should consider before waiving jurisdiction, Summers v.
State,4° gives the most comprehensive summary.
Once juvenile jurisdiction is waived, the juvenile is accorded the
same constitutional rights as adults; however, the juvenile's age and
34. Homicide by Juvenile - Jurisdiction, supra note 23, at 666.
35. Annotation, Rehabilitation - Juvenile Tried As Adult, 22 A.L.R. 4TH 1162, 1166 (1983).
36. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
37. See Statutes cited, supra notes 8 and 14.
38. Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 5032 (1984).
39. Homicide by Juvenile - Jurisdiction, supra note 23, at 671.
40. 230 N.E.2d 320 (Ind. 1967). Jurisdiction may be waived if the offense has specific pro-
secutive merit in the opinion of the prosecution attorney; or it is heinous or of an aggravated character,
greater weight being given to offenses against the person than to offenses against property; or, even
though less serious, if the offense is part of a repetitive pattern of juvenile offenses which would
lead to a determination that the said juvenile may be beyond rehabilitation under the regular statutory
juvenile procedures; or where it is found to be in the best interest of the public welfare and for the
protection of the public security generally that said juvenile be required to stand as an adult offender.
19891
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chances for rehabilitation are considered as mitigating factors .4
B. The Death Penalty and Eighth Amendment Analysis
1. Adult Death Sentencing
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution pro-
vides that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted.
'42
Because we live in an enlightened democracy, the Court has had
little occasion to interpret the Eighth Amendment. However, the
Court has held that "the basic concept underlying the Eighth
Amendment's ban on 'cruel and unusual' punishment [which can
be traced back to the Magna Carta], is nothing less than the dignity
of man."'43 In keeping with that basic concept, earlier modes of
execution such as decapitation, disembowment, and drawing and
quartering were all considered to be below the dignity of man, and
therefore, were cruel and unusual at the time of the Eighth Amend-
ment's adoption. 44 Conversely, every modern form of carrying out
the death penalty, including electrocution, 45 hanging, 46 shooting, 4
and lethal gas, 48 has been upheld not to be below the dignity of
man, and therefore, not "cruel and unusual" punishment.
The Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment
embraces, at a minimum, those modes or acts of punishment that
had been considered cruel and unusual at the time the Bill of Rights
was adopted, 49 or any punishment that is contrary to the "evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing soci-
ety."' 50 At the time the Bill of Rights was adopted, the common law
41. See, Stanford, 734 S.W.2d at 792.
42. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
43. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (emphasis added).
44. Note, The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause and the Substantive Criminal Law, 79
Hagv. L. REv. 635 (1966).
45. In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1880).
46. Dutton v. State, 123 Md. 373 (1914).
47. Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1879).
48. Gray v. Lucas, 710 F.2d 1048 (5th Cir. 1983).
49. Ford, 477 U.S. at 405.
50. Trop, 356 U.S. at 101.
[Vol. 92
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permitted the execution of adults, as well as juveniles. 1 Concerning
contemporary standards of modern society, the Court in Gregg v.
Georgia5 2 upheld capital punishment since the thirty-five states that
permitted such punishment were "[t]he most marked indication of
society's endorsement of the death penalty for murder." 3
Moreover, the Gregg Court held that the imposition of the death
penalty is not inherently cruel so as to constitute a violation of the
Eighth Amendment. In reaching this conclusion, the Gregg Court
emphasized three factors: (1) that the "imposition of the death pen-
alty for the crime of murder has a long history of acceptance both
in the United States and England";5 4 (2) that it was "now evident
that a large proportion of American society continues to regard it
as an appropriate and necessary criminal sanction"; 55 and (3) that
the death penalty serves "two principal social purposes: retribution
and deterrence of capital crimes by prospective offenders.
' 56
In a number of decisions, the Court enumerated those consid-
erations that must be included within a state statutory scheme pro-
viding for the death penalty. 7 Of those decisions, Gregg gives one
of the most comprehensive summaries:
[T]he prohibition against the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment is not
violated by the imposition of the death penalty for the crime of murder under
state's statutory scheme whereby (1) guilt or innocence is determined, either by
a jury or the trial judge, in the first stage of a bifurcated trial, with the judge
being required to charge the jury as to any lesser included offenses when supported
by any view of the evidence, (2) after a verdict, finding, a plea of guilty, a
presentence hearing is conducted, where the jury (or judge in a case tried without
a jury) hears argument and additional evidence in mitigation or aggravation of
punishment, (3) at least one of 10 aggravating circumstances specified in the sta-
tutes must be found to exist beyond a reasonable doubt, and must be designated
51. Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2974.
52. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
53. Id. at 175. The Gregg Court stated that in order to show that a punishment was contrary
to the evolving standards of decency, a national consensus must be established prohibiting such a
punishment, and the petitioner has the heavy burden of establishing such a national consensus against
such a punishment.
54. Id. at 176.
55. Id. at 179.
56. Id. at 183.
57. Ali. JUR. Criminal Law § 628 (1981) (citing numerous cases).
1989]
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in writing, before the jury (or judge) may elect to impose the death sentence on
a defendant convicted of murder, the trial judge in jury cases being bound by
the jury's recommended sentence, (4) on automatic appeal of a death sentence,
the state's highest court must determine whether the sentence was imposed under
the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor, whether the
evidence supported the finding of a statutory aggravating circumstance, and whether
the death sentence was excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in
similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant, and (5) if a death
sentence is affirmed, the decision of the state's highest court must include ref-
erence to similar cases that the court considered."
The above passage is unique in that it sets out three principles
the courts consider when imposing capital punishment: (1) presence
of mitigating or aggravating factors; (2) arbitrary imposition of cap-
ital punishment; and (3) proportionality analysis.
First, as the above statute proscribes, there must be an aggra-
vating circumstance present before capital punishment may be im-
posed, and notwithstanding such aggravating factor, if one or more
of the mitigating factors are present, then the jury or judge must
determine if the death sentence should be reduced to life impris-
onment. 9
Second, in Furman v. Georgia,6° a landmark case decided before
Gregg, the Court held that the death penalty cannot be imposed in
an arbitrary and capricious manner. Although the Gregg Court later
reconfirmed the constitutionality of capital punishment, it never-
theless expressed concerns similar to those expressed in Furman, and
provided that the requirements set out in Furman could be met "by
a carefully drafted statute that ensures that the sentencing authority
is given adequate information and guidance." '6'
Third, the leading case of Weems v. United States,6 2 established
what is commonly referred to as the "proportionality analysis doc-
trine." Weems involved a public official in the Philippines convicted
of falsifying an official record and was sentenced to fifteen years
of hard and painful labor and constant enchainment, deprivation
58. Id., (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. 153) (emphasis added).
59. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 208-11, for a listing of various aggravating factors; see also State
v. Wilkins, 736 S.W.2d at 410.
60. 408 U.S. 238, 249 (1972).
61. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 195.
62. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
[Vol. 92
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of parental authority, loss of the right to dispose of property inter
vivos, and continual surveillance for life. The Weems Court not only
viewed the punishment as inherently cruel, but also condemned the
penalty as excessive in relation to the crime committed.
Although the importance of proportionality analysis was signif-
icantly lessened in Badders v. United States,6 and Perkins v. North
Carolina,64 the Gregg Court gave special attention to proportionality
analysis with respect to the death penalty. The Gregg Court con-
sidered whether the punishment of death was disproportionate in
relation to the crime for which it was imposed (murder), and con-
cluded that "we are concerned here only with the imposition of
capital punishment for the crime of murder, and when life has been
taken deliberately by the offender, we cannot say that the punish-
ment is invariably disproportionate to the crime."
'6
Although proportionality analysis has been used in part by the
Court in post-Gregg decisions to invalidate capital punishment for
the crime of rape,66 and to invalidate felony prison sentences, 67 there
is no evidence that the Court is willing to reevaluate whether the
sentence of death is disproportionate to the crime of murder. Hence,
it is clear, especially in light of the instant Court's plurality decision,
that the death penalty is not disproportionate to the crime of mur-
der. Based on Gregg, if an adult offender was convicted of murder,
and the jury or judge found that certain aggravating circumstances
were present, then a senterice of death would not as a matter of
law be disproportionate to the crime. In effect, proportionality anal-
ysis is made obsolete under these circumstances. Moreover, if this
is true for adult capital sentencing, then the same rationale should
apply to juveniles under the jurisdiction of criminal courts.
2. Juvenile Death Sentencing
Because the Court has upheld the transferring of juveniles to
criminal courts,68 thus making juveniles subject to the same pun-
63. 240 U.S. 391 (1916).
64. 234 F. Supp. 333 (W.D.N.C. 1964).
65. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 187.
66. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
67. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
68. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
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ishments as adults, it only stands to reason that if a juvenile (over
the age of fifteen) commits a heinous murder for which an adult
would be sentenced to death, the juvenile would be subject to the
same punishment. Note, however, that special emphasis is placed
on the juvenile's age and chances of rehabilitation as mitigating
factors.
Because juveniles were sentenced to death at the time of the
Eighth Amendment's adoption, such punishment was not in vio-
lation of the Eighth Amendment. 9 Thus, to determine whether such
punishment offends the Eighth Amendment, it must be determined
whether such punishment is contrary to contemporary standards of
decency.
70
In Thompson, the plurality Court held that because all of the
states that had established a minimum age for capital punishment
had also prohibited the imposition of such punishment on fifteen-
year-old offenders, a national consensus prohibiting such a punish-
ment was shown.7'
In the instant case, the Court held that the petitioners failed to
show "national consensus" prohibiting the courts from imposing
the death sentence on sixteen or seventeen-year-old capital offenders
because the majority of the states that permit capital punishment
authorize it for crimes committed at age sixteen or above.72
IV. Ti DECISION OF THE COURT: THE SCALA PLURALITY
A. Some Preliminary Remarks
It is important at the outset to highlight some of the differences,
both factual and philosophical, which serve to distinguish the instant
cases from Thompson and other previous cases.
Foremost, it is important to note how the Justices are generally
aligned on this issue. Opponents of juvenile capital punishment in-
69. Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2974.
70. Trop, 356 U.S. at 101.
71. Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2695.
72. Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2975.
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dude Justices Stevens, Brennan, Blackmun, and Marshall. Advo-
cates of such punishment include Justices Scalia, White, Kennedy,
and Chief Justice Rehnquist. Justice O'Connor falls somewhere in
between the two: in Thompson she voted against such punishment,
but in the instant case she voted for such punishment.
Justice Stevens, who joined in the dissenting opinion in the in-
stant case, delivered the opinion of the Court in Thompson. Justice
Stevens was opposed to the imposition of capital punishment on
fifteen-year-old capital offenders.73 In support of its position, the
Thompson Court argued those points as established in Gregg,74 that
the enactments of state legislatures and the practice of juries are
both determinative of contemporary attitudes concerning sentencing
of juveniles. But the Thompson plurality (and Justice Brennan's
dissenting opinion in the instant cases) went beyond the standards
established in Gregg and held that legislation from other countries,
age-based statutory classifications, and opinions of respected or-
ganizations are "further indicators of contemporary standards of
decency. " 75
Concerning the relevancy of other nations' laws, the Thompson
plurality cited Trop v. Dulles,76 Coker v. Georgia,77 and Enmund
v. Florida.78 The fact that the cited cases are not on point does not
detract from the clear precedent that other nations' laws are relevant
when considering whether a punishment is cruel and unusual. More-
over, the fact that the United States Supreme Court has recognized
this factor on three separate occasions prior to Thompson tends to
establish not only its validity but its utility.
However, no case prior to Thompson establishes age-based stat-
utory classifications or the opinions of respected organizations, as
73. Id. at 2982 (Brennan, J., dissenting) Justice Brennan, who not only joined in the plurality
of Thompson, but penned the dissenting opinion in the instant cases, was totally opposed to capital
sentencing of any individual below eighteen years of age.
74. Thompson, 428 U.S. at 173-75, 181 (quoted in McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 300
(1987)).
75. Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2982-85.
76. Trop, 356 U.S. at 102 (involving citizenship).
77. 433 U.S. 584, 596 (1977) (involving capital sentencing for rape).
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objective indicators of American contemporary standards of de-
cency. 79 The Thompson plurality's apparent basis in accepting these
data as relevant "indicators" of contemporary standards of decency
is by way of analogy to the Court's acceptance of other nations'
laws as being relevant. The analogy being that since other nations'
laws were relevant, surely the enactments of American legislatures
and the positions of American organizations should be relevant also.
On the other hand, Justice Scalia, who not only filed the dis-
senting opinion in Thompson, but also delivered the opinion of the
Court in the instant cases made no mention of Thompson in his
opinion. Not surprisingly, Justice Scalia firmly rejected petitioners'
arguments concerning the relevancy of public opinion polls, views
of interest groups, and the positions of various professional asso-
ciations stating that "constitutional law [can not rest] upon such
uncertain foundations," 80 and further, rejected petitioners' argu-
ments on the issue of age-based statutory classifications because of
the "general" nature of the statutes. 81
Because the plurality did not discuss the relevancy of other
nations' laws, the dissent suggests that the plurality failed to rec-
ognize the relevancy of such data as established in Thompson, En-
mund, Coker, and Trop.82 However, simply because the plurality
did not discuss this issue does not mean that it did not consider it.
Nevertheless, in rejecting those arguments, especially those made by
the Thompson plurality, Justice Scalia essentially reduced the Eighth
Amendment question to an analysis of legislative acts and jury sen-
tencing.
B. Juvenile Executions: A Glance at Old Common Law
Although Justice Scalia did not explain his conclusion that a
punishment may be declared unconstitutional if it was considered
"cruel and unusual" at the time of the Eighth Amendment's adop-
tion, it nevertheless appears to be well settled that, at a minimum,
79. Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2692, 2696.
80. Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2979.
81. Id. at 2977.
82. Id. at 2985-86.
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if a mode or act of punishment was considered "cruel and unusual"
at the time of the Eighth Amendment's adoption, then it was un-
constitutional.83
In determining that the imposition of the death penalty on ju-
veniles did not constitute "cruel and unusual" punishment, the plu-
rality cited eighteenth century common law that at least in theory
permitted capital punishment to be imposed on anyone over the age
of seven.8 4 In what appears to be an effort to quickly dismiss dis-
cussion on this point, the plurality made reference to at least 407
executions of juveniles in this country since the Eighth Amendment's
adoption demonstrating that the execution of juveniles was not in
violation of the Eighth Amendment. The plurality's hasty dismissal
of its discussion on this point was nevertheless justified because (1)
neither petitioner raised this issue on appeal; (2) even if petitioners
would have made an issue on this point, it would have been futile
because the existing body of law would not support their conten-
tions; (3) its apparent intentions in raising this point was to establish
an historical precedent in this country that juvenile capital offenders
have been sentenced to death; and (4) although past precedent is
extremely relevant, the central issue in the instant cases must be
decided by contemporary standards of decency.
C. The Evolving Standards of Decency
1. Objective Indicia: Legislative Enactments
In determining whether a punishment was barred by the Eighth
Amendment, the Court held in Trop v. Dulles that "[t]he Amend-
ment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency
that mark the progress of a maturing society.
' 8 5
In recent years the Court has been of the opinion that American
society's current conceptions of decency as pronounced by its leg-
islative acts, and not the individual beliefs of the Court, are the
83. Ford, 477 U.S. at 405; Solem, 463 U.S. at 285-86.
84. Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2974.
85. Trop, 356 U.S. at 101 (emphasis added).
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appropriate indicators of this nation's "evolving standards of de-
cency." 8 6 The Gregg plurality further noted:
In a democratic society legislators, not courts, are constituted to respond to the
will and consequently the moral values of the people.8" The assessment [of con-
temporary values] does not call for a subjective judgment. It requires, rather,
that we look to objective indicia that reflect the public attitude toward a given
sanction.-
Based on its earlier holdings,8 9 and the deference owed to state
legislators, 90 the Court concluded that the statutes passed by society's
representatives were the first "objective indicia" that reflect the
"public attitude toward a given sanction." 91
Because Justice Scalia was of the opinion that a resolution of
this issue only involved those states that permitted capital punish-
ment, 92 he therefore did not consider those states that prohibited
capital punishment altogether. By eliminating such states, fifteen in
all,93 he was left with a total of thirty-seven states that permitted
capital punishment. Of the thirty-seven states whose laws permit
capital punishment, fifteen decline to impose it on sixteen-year-old
offenders and twelve decline to impose it on seventeen-year-old of-
fenders.9 4 Justice Scalia concluded that the petitioners failed to show
a "national consensus" prohibiting such punishment because the
majority of states, twenty-two out of thirty-seven permit sixteen-
year-olds to be executed; and the majority of states, twenty-five out
of thirty-seven permit seventeen-year-olds to be executed.
It is not clear whether Justice Scalia's opinion reflects American
society's attitudes toward such punishment, or the Court's. As the
86. Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2974-75.
87. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 175.
88. Id. at 173 (emphasis added).
89. Coker, 433 U.S. at 592; Penry v. Lynbaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934 (1989); Ford, 477 U.S. at
406; Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 788-89 (1982); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 277-79
(1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
90. Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2975-77.
91. Id.
92. Id. Justice Scalia stated that "[t]he issue in the present case is not whether capital pun-
ishment is thought to be desirable but whether persons under 18 are thought to be specially exempt
from it."
93. In this discussion, the District of Columbia is treated as one of the 50 states, thus making
51 total states.
94. Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2975.
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dissenting opinion pointed out, a "national consensus" cannot be
reached without considering those states that totally prohibit capital
punishment. In those fifteen states, including the District of Co-
lumbia, neither adults nor juveniles may be executed. Because the
Court's goal was to ascertain the number of states that prohibit
such punishment, those fifteen states should have been included in
the survey.95 If they would have been included, the Court would
have found that a majority of the states, thirty out of fifty-one,
prohibit the execution of sixteen-year-olds, 96 and that twenty-seven
out of fifty-one prohibit the execution of seventeen-year-olds. 97 Justice
Scalia based his analysis on this point on the Court's earlier decision
in Tison v. Arizona.9 In upholding Arizona's death penalty for ma-
jor participation in a felony with reckless indifference to human life,
the Tison Court noted that only eleven of those jurisdictions im-
posing capital punishment rejected its use in such circumstances. 99
The Tison Court properly excluded those states that prohibited cap-
ital punishment altogether because it was not determining whether
capital punishment was per se unconstitutional (that issue was de-
cided by Gregg) but rather, what crimes were punishable by the
death penalty in those states which provided for such a punishment.
Based on Tison, Justice Scalia concluded that since the majority of
the states that permit capital punishment authorize it for crimes
committed at age sixteen or above the petitioners failed to show a
national consensus prohibiting such a punishment.
95. It scarcely advanced the plurality's argument to point out that the dissent, in its tallying
of the applicable states, overlooked those eighteen states that not only permit capital punishment,
but also, set no minimum age limit. Such reference only tended to distort the tolling process because
the number of states that presently permit such punishment does not disturb the number of states
that presently oppose such punishment.
96. Of the states that impose capital punishment, fifteen decline to impose it on sixteen-year-
old offenders while fourteen states and the District of Columbia prohibit capital punishment altogether,
This makes a total of thirty states opposed to the execution of sixteen-year-olds. The dissenting opinion
also pointed out that the plurality's tallying of those states that prohibit capital punishment was in
error. To those fourteen states, the dissent would add the states of Vermont and South Dakota.
However, even if Vermont and South Dakota were improperly excluded, such error was harmless;
the inclusion of the fourteen uncontested states would have been sufficient to overturn the decision
- without Vermont or South Dakota.
97. Of the states that impose capital punishment, 12 decline to impose it on seventeen-year-
old offenders while fourteen states and the District of Columbia prohibit capital punishment altogether.
This makes a total of 27 states opposed to the execution of seventeen-year-olds.
98. 481 U.S. 137, (1987).
99, Id. at 154.
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The plurality, in basing its analysis on this point on Tison over-
looked its analysis in Ford v. Wainwright.10 In striking down the
execution of the insane, the Ford Court held that the contemporary
values of American society did not permit such punishment on the
insane. 10' In determining such a national consensus, the Ford Court
did not begin its survey with those states that provided for capital
punishment, rather it first turned to each of the States, including
those that prohibit capital punishment altogether.0 2 Further, the cen-
tral issue posed in the instant cases, whether juveniles may be ex-
ecuted, is more analogous to the central issue posed in Ford (whether
the insane may be executed) and less analogous to the central issue
in Tison (whether a person convicted of major participation in a
felony with reckless indifference to human life could be executed).
In Tison, the Court ruled on what type of crimes are punishable
by death. In the instant case (regarding juveniles) and the Ford case
(regarding the insane) the Court ruled on what type of individuals
may be sentenced to death. Justice Scalia noted in the instant cases
that "the issue . . . is not whether capital punishment is thought to
be desirable but whether [individuals] under eighteen are thought to
be specially exempt from it."103 Likewise, the Ford Court was not
ruling on whether capital punishment was thought to be desirable
but whether insane individuals were thought to be specially exempt
from it.
Although the Court plurality could have distinguished the instant
cases from Tison and ruled that it was proper to include in the
survey all 50 states in determining a "national consensus," it was
not bound to do so. The Ford Court noted that "no State in the
Union permits the execution of the insane," but in a footnote of
100. 477 U.S. 399, 408. Ford was convicted of murder in 1974 and sentenced to death. There
was no suggestion that he was incompetent at the time of his offense, at trial, or at sentencing. While
imprisoned, in 1983, Ford was diagnosed as having a major mental disorder. Counsel for Ford moved
to have Ford declared incompetent. A panel of three psychiatrists diagnosed Ford as having three
different mental disorders, but each concluded that Ford understood why he was going to be executed.
The Governor signed the death warrant. Counsel for Ford filed a habeas corpus proceeding in Federal
District Court which denied the petition. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. The U.S.
Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case to determine if Ford was incompetent.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2975, n.2.
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that text the Ford Court explained that "[ojf the 50 States, 41 have
a death penalty or statutes governing execution procedures." 1 4 The
Ford Court went on to analyze those forty-one state statutes. It is
not clear whether the Ford Court placed a premium importance, or
any importance at all, on the fact that all 50 States prohibited the
execution of the insane. More specifically, the mere mention of those
states that prohibited capital punishment altogether could be con-
strued to mean that their importance was nominal since all forty-
one states that permitted capital punishment at that time prohibited
the execution of the insane. Nevertheless, the fact that the Ford
Court did note that all 50 states prohibited such punishment in ruling
that there was a "national consensus" against executing the insane
was sufficient grounds for the Court to have adopted the principles
set out in Ford, thus distinguishing Tison from the instant cases.
2. Objective Indicia: Sentencing Practices of Juries
Concerning the relevancy of jury sentencing practices in deter-
mining this nation's contemporary attitudes toward juvenile capital
punishment, the Gregg Court held that "[t]he jury also is a sig-
nificant and reliable objective index of contemporary values because
it maintains 'a link between contemporary community values and
the penal system.' "05
Justice Scalia's rejection of petitioners' claim that the sentencing
practices of juries established a national consensus against sentencing
juveniles to death was not in contravention of the Court's holding
in Gregg because (1) the Court met its requirement to include jury
sentencing practices as an objective indicium in determining Amer-
ican contemporary values; and (2) it assessed that objective indicium
in a manner consistent with Gregg.10 6
Of course, any assessment of statistical data, such as sentencing
statistics, necessarily induces different interpretations. As Justice
104. Ford, 477 U.S. at 408, n.2.
105. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 181.
106. Id. at 182.
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Stevens pointed out in Thompson, "[sitatistics of this kind can, of
course, be interpreted in different ways."' 1
In Thompson, Justice Stevens interpreted similar data: Out of
1,393 total death sentences between 1982-86, only five individuals
under the age of sixteen were sentenced to death. Justice Stevens
concluded that the statistics "suggest that these five young offenders
have received sentences that are 'cruel and unusual in the same way
that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual.' "108
Justice Scalia, however, interpreted the sentencing data in the
instant cases to mean something quite different. Justice Scalia found
that (1) the reason there are fewer death sentences imposed on ju-
veniles than adults was because there are fewer number of juvenile
capital offenders; and, (2) the reason prosecutors and juries rarely
impose the death penalty on juveniles (less than two percent of the
total death sentences imposed) is because they are induced to believe
that it should never be imposed. 10 9 The main weakness with Justice
Scalia's interpretation of course, is that it should not make a dif-
ference why juries rarely impose the death penalty on juvenile of-
fenders, but simply that they do. Though Justice Scalia's
interpretation may seem skewed, it nevertheless was well founded
on the Court's earlier decision in Gregg which held that "the re-
luctance of juries in many cases to impose the sentence may well
reflect the humane feeling that this most irrevocable of sanctions
should be reserved for a small number of extreme cases." 10 Further,
because there was no inference that the sentences were "arbitrarily
imposed" due to their rarity, the Court did not contravene its hold-
ing in Furman,"' which held arbitrary death sentences unconstitu-
-tional.
3. "Illegitimate" Objective Indicia?
Justice Brennan claims in his dissenting opinion that Justice Scalia
treats the statute and jury investigation as a complete and conclusive
107. Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2697.
108. Id.
109. Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2977.
110. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 182.
111. 408 U.S. at 249. Rarity of a sentence leads to an inference of its arbitrary imposition. The
Eighth Amendment prohibits arbitrary death sentences.
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indicator of a "national consensus."l"2 Justice Brennan suggests that
since the Thompson plurality established age-based statutory clas-
sifications, as a proper "indicator" of contemporary standards,
Justice Scalia improperly rejected the indicia such as Federal Leg-
islation, "socioscientific" evidence, views of professional organi-
zations and interest groups, and other nations' laws as relevant
indicators of contemporary views.
To be sure, the Gregg Court did not specifically limit the ob-
jective indicia of contemporary standards to only legislative acts and
jury decisions, but it did specify certain criteria that indicia should
meet in order to be considered as "objective indicia of contemporary
standards." The indicia must not only be "representative" of so-
ciety, but also, a "good reflex" of society's views." 3 The Gregg
Court found that state statutes promulgated by society's represen-
tatives, and the practices of American juries clearly reflected and
represented society's contemporary views. Conversely, the Gregg
Court rejected the courts as proper "objective indicia" because they
were not representative bodies and "[were] not designed to be a
good reflex of a democratic society.' '1 4 Although Justice Scalia did
not specifically mention these criteria, his rejection of petitioners'
arguments concerning the relevancy of other laws (federal statutes
and age-based statutes) and the opinions of other non-representative
groups (professional associations, organizations, and interest groups)
was apparently based on similar grounds.
Petitioners' claimed that The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988,115
which prohibited the capital sentencing of drug offenders under the
age of eighteen, was a proper "objective indicia" of society's views
concerning this issue. Not surprising, Justice Scalia rejected this con-
tention stating (1) that even if there were no federal statute per-
mitting capital sentencing of individuals under eighteen years of age,
"that would not remotely establish-in the face of a substantial
number of state statutes to the contrary-a national consensus that
112. Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2982.
113. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 175.
114. Id.
115. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100-690 § 2001(1), 102 stat. 4390.
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such a punishment is inhumane ... 16 and (2) that the judgment
by the Federal Legislature does not even suggest that -"no murder
is heinous enough to warrant the execution of such a youthful of-
fender, but merely that the narrow class of offense it defines is
not." 1 7 Although it is fairly clear that the Act does not apply to
the specific issue at hand, it is nevertheless important to note whether
Justice Scalia treated this federal legislation as a proper "objective
indicia" of society. Justice Scalia's statement that "[petitioners']
reliance [on the Act] is entirely misplaced""18 dispels any notion that
he treated the Act as an objective indicia. Based on the criteria
outlined in Gregg, Justice Scalia could have recognized this federal
legislation as an objective indicia; however, because the Act only
prohibited the execution of individuals under the age of eighteen
for drug-related offenses under the Act, such recognition was not
necessary for the Court to come to the same conclusion.
Petitioners further argued that age-based statutory classifications
(drinking, driving and voting) reflect a public attitude that indivi-
duals below eighteen years of age are not responsible for their ac-
tions. In rejecting this contention the plurality held that (1) there
can be no meaningful comparison between the maturity required to
partake in the aforementioned privileges and the maturity required
to "understand that murdering another person is profoundly wrong
and is contrary to most minimum of civilized standards;" (2) such
laws do not represent a social judgment that all persons under 18
are not responsible enough to drink, drive, or vote, but at most a
judgment that the vast majority are not; and (3) that the criminal
justice system must provide individual testing, not in-gross cate-
gorizing." 9 Since these statutes were also promulgated by state leg-
islators, it would stand to reason that they would fall under the
heading of "objective indicia" as set out in Gregg. However, the
Gregg Court did not suggest that. general laws concerning age were
relevant, rather, those enactments setting forth the punishments that
were at issue. The Court concluded that "in assessing a punishment
116. Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2976-77.
117. Id. at 2976.
118. Id. (emphasis added).
119. Id. at 2977-79.
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selected by a democratically elected legislature against the consti-
tutional measure, we presume its validity. We may not require the
legislature to select the least severe penalty possible so long as the
penalty selected is not cruelly inhumane or disproportionate to the
crime involved.' ' 20 Based on the Court's decision in Gregg, and
notwithstanding Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Thomp-
son, 21 Justice Scalia properly rejected petitioners contentions that
age-based statutory classifications reflect a public policy against the
capital sentencing of sixteen and seventeen-year-old offenders.
Finally, petitioners asserted that "socioscientific" evidence in-
dicates that executing juveniles fails to serve the legitimate goals of
penology (deterrence and retribution). Petitioners asserted that "[the
death penalty] fails to deter because juveniles, possessing less de-
veloped cognitive skills than adults, are less likely to fear death; and
it fails to exact just retribution because juveniles, being less mature
and responsible, are also less morally blameworthy.' '122 In rejecting
this notion, Justice Scalia noted that if petitioners' contention was
true, "the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
would invalidate these laws for lack of rational basis. ' 12 However,
Justice Scalia ruled that because it cannot be shown that no sixteen
or seventeen-year-old is not deterred or responsible, such punishment
does not fall under the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, Justice Scalia
returned to the Eighth Amendment to determine that such evidence
was not an "objective indicia" of contemporary views.
D. Proportionality Analysis
As noted above, the Court in post-Weems cases' 24 significantly
curtailed the importance of proportionality analysis. Gregg gave spe-
cial consideration to proportionality analysis only as it related to
120. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 175.
121. Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2980. In Thompson, J. O'Connor specifically identified age-based
statutory classifications as relevant to Eighth Amendment proportionality analysis. Thompson is the
only opinion establishing age-based classification as "objective indicia."
122. Id. at 2979.
123. Id.
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the punishment of death for the crime of murder. However, Coker
reaffirmed the significance of proportionality analysis in that it ex-
amines whether the punishment imposed is proportionate to the de-
fendant's blameworthiness, and whether the punishment makes any
"'measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment."") 25
In the light of all the different applications of "proportionality
analysis" Justice Scalia implied that (1) the results of proportionality
analysis are based on the same "objective indicia" as the "evolving
standards of decency" analysis; (2) the two methodologies, in effect,
are duplicative of one another; and (3) since "evolving standards
of decency" analysis is necessary to determine whether contemporary
standards prohibit such punishment, proportionality analysis is ob-
solete. In furtherance of that proposition, Justice Scalia suggests that
since society has not set its face against such a punishment through
its legislative acts and jury decisions it has thus condoned such pun-
ishment as being proportional to the crime committed and the pe-
titioners' blameworthiness. 26
V. CONCURRING OPINION OF JUSTICE O'CONNOR
Justice O'Connor in agreeing with the judgment of the Court
placed special emphasis on the fact that eighteen states expressly set
the age of sixteen as the minimum age in which an individual may
be executed. This emphasis is problematic. In Thompson, Justice
O'Connor (separate concurring opinion) gave identical treatment to
those eighteen states as she did in the instant cases. To those eighteen
states, however, Justice O'Connor added those fourteen states that
prohibited capital punishment altogether in concluding that "almost
two thirds of the state legislatures have definitely concluded that no
fifteen-year-old should be exposed to the threat of execution."'' 27 If
those fourteen states that prohibited capital punishment altogether
were applicable in showing a "national consensus" concerning the
imposition of capital punishment on fifteen-year-olds, there is no
sound reason why Justice O'Connor excluded those fourteen states
125. Coker, 433 U.S. at 592.
126. Id.
127. Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2706 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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in her analysis in the instant cases. If those fourteen states would
have been added to those fifteen states that prohibited the execution
of sixteen-year-olds, and to those twelve states that prohibited the
execution of seventeen-year-olds, the majority of the states would
have prohibited such punishment on sixteen and seventeen-year-old
capital offenders. If the Court's "objective" ideals fall short of
reality, it was due to Justice O'Connor's careless disregard of her
own holdings.
Finally, although Justice O'Connor noted that the plurality em-
phatically rejected her suggestion that it was constitutionally obli-
gated to judge whether the "nexus between the punishment imposed
and the defendant's blameworthiness is proportional,"' 2 she nev-
ertheless held that such analysis was not necessary because "these
... cases cannot be resolved through proportionality analysis.' ' 2
9
This apparent contradiction is somewhat explained in Justice O'Con-
nor's concurring opinion in Thompson.'30 Justice O'Connor suggests
that because no evidence can be proffered showing that no sixteen
or seventeen-year-olds are incapable of the moral culpability that
would justify the imposition of capital punishment, or that sixteen
or seventeen-year-olds as a class are inherently incapable of being
deterred from major crimes by the prospect of the death penalty,
proportionality analysis is not a totally reliable test. In other words,
there are some sixteen and seventeen-year-old individuals that are
blameworthy and are capable of being deterred. Notwithstanding all
these differences, the plurality (including Justice O'Connor) arrived
at a common ground: proportionality analysis, at the very least, was
not essential to the resolution of these particular cases.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although the Court's decision in Stanford was intended to reflect
contemporary society's values regarding the execution of sixteen and
seventeen-year-old criminal offenders, it failed to do so because the
Justices made their decision based on objective data interpreted in
128. Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2981.
129. Id. at 2982.
130. Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2708 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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a subjective manner. The Court in Stanford thus reflected its own
interpretation of the Eighth Amendment values far more than it
reflected the values of contemporary American society.
Justice O'Connor's opinion was not consistent with her prior
holding in Thompson where she considered the laws of those states
that categorically prohibited capital punishment as "objective in-
dicia" of contemporary society's views. At the very least, it appears
that Justice O'Connor's rejection of those same data in the instant
case was a subjective (and inconsistent) decision, and therefore, in
contravention of the ruling in Coker which held that "Eighth
Amendment judgments should not be, or appear to be, merely the
subjective views of individual Justices; judgment should be informed
by objective factors to the maximum possible extent.' 3' The sig-
nificance of this discrepancy is enormous; if Justice O'Connor would
have included those fourteen states which prohibited capital pun-
ishment altogether, it is highly probable that she would have joined
with the dissent, and therefore, in effect, reversed the decision of
the Court.
The plurality also rejected the same data, and based such a re-
jection on its earlier decision in Tison. As noted above, the plurality
could have distinguished Tison, (deciding the-propriety of the death
penalty for certain crimes) from the instant case (deciding the pro-
priety of capital punishment for certain classes of individuals) by
reflecting on its decision in Ford. Again, if such a distinction would
have been made, the plurality would have come to the conclusion
that the majority of the states prohibit the execution of sixteen and
seventeen-year-olds.
Although the Gregg Court intended to limit its "subjective" in-
fluence in determining contemporary standards, it did not intend to
completely erase the Court's role in resolving constitutional ques-
tions. "Of course, the requirements of the Eighth Amendment must
be applied with an awareness of the limited role to be played by
the courts. This does not mean that judges have no role to play,
for the Eighth Amendment is a restraint upon the exercise of leg-
131. Coker, 433 U.S. at 592.
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islative power. ' 132 Further, if the Court was confined to making
decisions based solely on the "objective" guidelines as stated in
Gregg, state legislators could cumulatively pass laws in contravention
of the U.S. Constitution. Such a result was clearly not the intent
of the Gregg Court. It seems clear from Gregg that although the
Court could not dictate personal preferences in selecting various in-
dicia, it could, however, assess those indicia in a subjective manner
orice they were objectively established. This back-door analysis was
exactly how the Court in Gregg, Thompson, and Stanford reached
their respective, and sometimes differing, conclusions concerning the
same objective indicia.
Thus, the instant decision may be viewed either as an invalid
reflection of contemporary society's attitudes toward juvenile capital
punishment, or a proper reflection based on the Court's ability to
interpret "objective indicia" of contemporary society's views. If the
former is true, then, those states which permit capital punishment
but set no minimum age limit may amend their laws in response to
this decision. 3 3 Even if the latter is true, this decision is still ex-
tremely important because it is a pronouncement of this nation's
policy concerning juvenile capital punishment.
Jeffery L. Robinette
132. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 174.
133. Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2976, n.3.
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